Jjq* dZddlmZddlZddlmZmZddlmZddl m Z ddl m Z ddl mZmZdd lmZmZmZdd lmZGd d eeZed GddZed GddZGddZgdZy)aFail-closed authorization boundary for model and external-data egress. The gateway intentionally receives a digest and classifications, never a raw prompt. Callers must assemble and sanitize the payload before this boundary; providers may only be called after a successful decision has been recorded. Remoteness is decided by the policy allowlists, never by a caller supplied flag. A provider that appears in neither allowlist is denied: there is no default-open path through this boundary. ) annotationsN) dataclassfield)Enum) ip_address)urlsplit)AuditEventTypeAuditLog)EgressPermissionGateLocalClassificationGateRemoteClassificationGate) SecurityErrorc eZdZdZdZdZdZdZy)DataClassificationz>Highest sensitivity carried by a payload or retrieved context.publicpersonal sensitive restrictedN)__name__ __module__ __qualname____doc__PUBLICPERSONAL SENSITIVE RESTRICTEDH/home/oem/CyberBrain26-unified/src/cyberbrain26/security_plane/egress.pyrrsH FHIJrrT)frozencZeZdZUdZded<ded<ded<eeZded<d Zded <y ) EgressRequestzMinimal, non-content-bearing description of one outbound request. ``destination`` is the real endpoint the caller intends to reach. It is never trusted as-is: only a sanitised host form reaches the audit record. stragent_id provider_idpayload_sha256default_factoryfrozenset[DataClassification]classifications destinationN) rrrr__annotations__r frozensetr*r,rrrr"r"&s4 M5:95UO2UKrr"ceZdZUdZeeZded<edZded<eeZ ded<ed Z ded <y ) EgressPolicyzExplicit allowlists for remote destinations and permitted data classes. Both allowlists default to empty. A caller therefore has to name every provider on purpose before any egress - local or remote - is permitted. r'zfrozenset[str]allowed_remote_providersc6ttjhSN)r.rrrrrzEgressPolicy.?s +=+D+D*E Frr)allowed_remote_classificationslocal_provider_idscrttjtjtjhSr3)r.rrrrrrrr4zEgressPolicy.Cs)  & &(:(C(CEWEaEa b! rallowed_local_classificationsN) rrrrrr.r1r-r5r6r8rrrr0r05s[ 05Y/OnODIFE"$A*/y)IICH D!#@rr0ceZdZdZ ddd ddZddZddZddZedd Z dd Z dd Z e dd Z d dddZe ddZy) EgressGateaAuthorize egress only when destination, data class and audit are known. ``audit_log`` is required: a gate that cannot record a decision must not be constructible, otherwise every caller would have to rediscover that at the moment it tries to send data. NF base_decisionc|xs t|_||_t|jj|_t |jj|_t||_ y)N)allowedr;) r0policy audit_logr r5remote_classification_gater r8local_classification_gater egress_permission_gate)selfr?r@r<s r__init__zEgressGate.__init__Qsb.  "+CKK>>+ '*AKK==* &';&W#rcn|j||j|jj|s|j |d|j |j jvr?|jj|s|j |d|j|ns|j |j jvr?|jj|s|j |d|j|n|j |d|j|dy)zDRaise :class:`SecurityError` unless this specific egress is allowed.zegress permission deniedzremote classifications deniedzlocal classifications deniedz9provider is in neither the remote nor the local allowlistr>)resultN)_validate_request_require_auditrCevaluate_denyr%r?r1rA_authorize_remoter6rB_authorize_local_record)rDrequests r authorizezEgressGate.authorizeds w' **33G< JJw : ;   $++"F"F F22;;GD 7$CD  " "7 +  DKK$B$B B11::7C 7$BC  ! !' * JJw [ \ WY /rc|j|jjz }|r7djt d|D}|j |d|yy)zDRemote egress additionally has to pass the data-classification gate., c34K|]}|jywr3value.0items r z/EgressGate._authorize_remote..~$GDTZZ$Gz2payload classifications are not allowed remotely: N)r*r?r5joinsortedrKrDrO disallowednamess rrLzEgressGate._authorize_remotezsU,,t{{/Y/YY IIf$GJ$GGHE JJw"TUZT[ \ ] rc.|jr-|j|js|j|d|j|jj z }|r7dj td|D}|j|d|yy)aLocal egress skips no control at all. Being on the allowlist only proves the owner named the provider; it proves nothing about where the bytes actually go. A provider name is a string a caller controls, so treating "local" as a licence to skip the classification gate would reintroduce the very bypass that ``destination_is_remote`` used to be. Local traffic therefore runs through its own classification policy, and only ``RESTRICTED`` is excluded by default. zHprovider is declared local but the destination is not a loopback addressrRc34K|]}|jywr3rTrVs rrYz.EgressGate._authorize_local..rZr[z:payload classifications are not allowed for local egress: N)r,_is_loopback_destinationrKr*r?r8r\r]r^s rrMzEgressGate._authorize_locals   t'D'DWEXEX'Y JJw j k,,t{{/X/XX IIf$GJ$GGHE JJw"\]b\c d e rc|j}d|vrd|} t|}|jxsdj}|dvs|j dry t |jS#t$rYywxYw#t$rYywxYw)a#True only for a destination whose host is a loopback literal. Host names such as ``localhost`` are accepted, but nothing that could resolve off-box; resolution is deliberately not attempted here, so an attacker-controlled DNS name cannot decide this branch. //r+F>::1 localhostz127.T)striprhostnamelower ValueError startswithr is_loopback)clsr, candidatepartshosts rrcz#EgressGate._is_loopback_destinations %%' y YK(I Y'ENN(b//1D ' '4??6+B d#// /     s#)A0A?0 A<;A<? B  B c2|j tdy)zEFail closed when no audit log is present, even though it is required.Nz2egress denied because audit logging is unavailable)r@r)rDs rrIzEgressGate._require_audits >> ! TU U "rc |j|d|t d|#t$r%}|dt|jd}Yd}~7d}~wwxYw)aRecord the refusal when possible, but always end in a refusal. A failing audit write must not turn a denial into an unrelated exception, and it must never let the request through: the ``SecurityError`` is raised whether or not the record succeeded. denied)rGerrorz (audit write failed: )Nzegress denied: )rN Exceptiontyperr)rDrOreasonrus rrKzEgressGate._denys` N LLL @ofX677 Nx5d5k6J6J5K1MF Ns$ AA  Ac|j}|syd|vrd|} t|}|j}|j}|sy|j }|r|d|S|S#t$rYywxYw)a[Reduce a destination to a bare ``host[:port]`` safe for an audit row. Credentials live in the userinfo section of a URL. ``urlsplit().netloc`` keeps that userinfo, so only ``hostname`` and ``port`` may be used. The path, query and fragment are dropped outright: they routinely carry API keys and personal identifiers, and an audit log must never become the place where those accumulate. Percent-encoded separators cannot survive this reduction because the host is re-read from the parsed authority, never copied out of the raw string. r+rezz :)rhrriportrkrj)r,rorprqr|s r_sanitize_destinationz EgressGate._sanitize_destinations %%'  y YK(I .Y'E>>D::D zz|#'$q1T1 .. .s#A A+*A+r+)ruc,|j|jjv}|jxs |j}|jj t j|j|jd|j|jxs |j|||rdnd|jtd|jD|j|tj|jj!d y)N model_egressremotelocalc34K|]}|jywr3rTrVs rrYz%EgressGate._record..s)Y$**)Yr[)r&r*destination_hostdestination_sha256)actorr$actionresourcerGrunetwork_actionmetadata)r%r?r1r,r@recordr DATA_ACCESSr$r}r&r]r*hashlibsha256encode hexdigest)rDrOrGru is_remoteraw_destinations rrNzEgressGate._records''4;;+O+OO !--D1D1D   & &""%%!//0C0CD[H[H['08g")"8"8#))YAXAX)Y#Y$($>$>$O&-nn_5K5K5M&N&X&X&Z   rc|jjr|jjs tdt |j dk7s*t d|j jDr tdy)Nz1egress agent_id and provider_id must not be empty@c3$K|]}|dv yw)0123456789abcdefNr)rW characters rrYz/EgressGate._validate_request..s4 4=I/ /4 sz3payload_sha256 must be a SHA-256 hexadecimal digest)r$rhr%rklenr&anyrj)rOs rrHzEgressGate._validate_requestsz%%'w/B/B/H/H/JPQ Q w%% &" ,4 AHAWAWA]A]A_4 1 RS S1 rr3)r?zEgressPolicy | Noner@r r<boolreturnNone)rOr"rr)r,r#rr)rr)rOr"ryr#rr)r,r#rr#)rOr"rGr#rur#rr)rrrrrErPrLrM classmethodrcrIrK staticmethodr}rNrHrrrr:r:Is'+X $ X#X X  X  X&0,^f&0V 8 2 2DLN *TTrr:)rr:r0r")r __future__rr dataclassesrrenumr ipaddressr urllib.parser!cyberbrain26.security_plane.auditr r ,cyberbrain26.security_plane.extension_pointsr r r &cyberbrain26.security_plane.permissionrr#rr"r0r:__all__rrrrs #( !F Ad $    $&uTuTp Pr