JjrUdZddlmZddlZddlZddlmZmZddlm Z m Z ddl m Z ddl mZmZddlmZmZmZdd lmZmZdd lmZgd Zd d dddZded<dZded<dZded<eddhZded<GddeZ e dGd d!Z!ejDd"Z#d#ed$<ejDd%Z$d#ed&<ejDd'Z%d#ed(<ejDd)Z&d#ed*<ejDd+Z'd#ed,<ejDd-Z(d#ed.<ejDd/Z)d#ed0<dd1Z*dd2Z+e dGd3d4Z,e!d56Z-e!d76Z.e,d8d9dd:d;ded?e,d@dAdBdCdDdehdEe.e!dFdGHdIdJK e,dLdMdBdNdOddPehdQe!dRdBdSTe!dRdBdUTe!dRddVTe!dW6e!dFdXHdYdZ[ e,d\d]dBdCdOdd^ed_d`he-e!dRdadbTe!dRdBdcTe!dRdBddTe!dRdBdUTe!dRdBdeTe!dRdBdfTdgdh[ e,didjdBdSdOdd^ehdke!dRdBddTe!dRdBdUTe!dRdBdfTe!dRdadbTe!dRddVTdldm[ e,dndodBdpdDddqedrhe.e!dRdBdNTe!dRdBdeTdsdtdue!dv6iidwx e,dydzdtdpdDdd^ed{d|he!dRdBdfTe!dRddVTe!d}d~Hdd[ e,dddtddDdd^ehde!dRdBdTe!dRdBdVTe!dRdBdUTe!dRddVTe!dRdBdTe!dFdHe!dFdHe!d6ddVedhid e,dddVdpdOddedhe!d6e-e!dddNTdd e,dddVddDdedhd?e,dddVdpdDdddd Z/ded<ddZ0ddZ1ddZ2 ddZ3 ddZ4e dGddZ5ddddd ddZ6ddZ7ddZ8 ddZ9ddZ:y)u Pentest tool catalog: the boundary that turns a declared intent into an argv. The model never supplies an argument vector. It declares an *intent* (``{tool, target, args, level}``) and this module reconstructs the command line from the catalog, refusing anything the catalog does not already permit. That inversion is the whole point: * an allowlist of arguments the tool may carry, checked token by token; * a forbidden list and a forbidden-prefix list, checked **before** the allowlist, so no argument can be both; * a check on every invocation that the target lies inside the engagement's :class:`~cyberbrain26.agents.engagement.TargetScope`; * a check that the engagement artifact permits this tool at this level. Fail-closed everywhere. There is no fallback to a raw shell, no "unknown tool means run it anyway", and no path where a missing catalog, a missing scope or a missing engagement artifact produces a run instead of a refusal. Every refusal is written to the audit log. What the catalog deliberately does not model -------------------------------------------- * **No NSE scripts** for nmap (``--script``), no ``-e``, no ``-oN``/``-oG``: scripts execute code, output files escape the sandbox, and ``-e`` publishes the operator's MAC on the wire. * **No shells anywhere.** sqlmap's ``--os-shell``/``--os-cmd``/``--sql-shell`` and ``--exec`` are permanently forbidden, at every level, including L3: they hand a shell to a remote host rather than testing it. * **No output-to-file and no redirect options.** Anything that writes outside the one writable workspace bind is refused; ``-o``-family options are prefixes in the forbidden list for that reason. * **No redirect following** (curl ``-L``/``--location``, httpx ``-fr``): a redirect can leave the authorised target without any further check. * **No second target.** Every option that can itself carry a target (``-u``, ``-h``, ``-iL``, ``-t``, ``-x``, ``-l``…) is in the forbidden list, so the only target in the process argument vector is the one that was checked against the scope. * **No credentials on the command line** (hydra ``-p``, curl ``-u user:pw``). Password material must come from a file inside the workspace, which keeps it out of the audit trail. * Only unprivileged scan modes are permitted (nmap ``-sT``/``-sn``, not ``-sS``/``-sU``): a raw-socket scan needs privileges this system does not grant, and asking for it would mean asking for a weaker sandbox. Argv values are passed to the sandbox as a vector. They are still validated: a value is only accepted when it matches the narrow rule declared for its option, because the same token is what a reviewer reads in the audit trail. ) annotationsN)MappingSequence) dataclassfield)Path)AnyFinal)TOOL_CLASS_BY_LEVELEngagementAuthorization TargetScope)AuditEventTypeAuditLog) SecurityError) ACTION_BY_LEVELCATALOG MAX_ARGUMENTSAuthorizedToolCallPentestRefusal PentestTool ValueRuleaction_for_levelauthorize_tool_call catalog_entrydescribe_catalogtool_class_for_level read_file scan_network vuln_scanexploit_target)rzFinal[dict[int, str]]rz Final[int]rMAX_ARGUMENT_LENGTHnetwork workspacezFinal[frozenset[str]] _TARGET_KINDSc$eZdZdZdfd ZxZS)rzA tool call was refused by the catalog. Attributes: reason_code: Stable machine-readable label recorded in the audit log, so a refusal can be counted and alerted on without parsing prose. c2t||||_yN)super__init__ reason_code)selfr/message __class__s I/home/oem/CyberBrain26-unified/src/cyberbrain26/agents/pentest_catalog.pyr.zPentestRefusal.__init__is !&)r/strr1r5returnNone)__name__ __module__ __qualname____doc__r. __classcell__)r2s@r3rras''r4rT)frozencFeZdZUdZded<dZded<dZded <dZded <y ) raThe narrow rule one option's value has to satisfy. Options are always written in attached form (``-p80``, ``--level3``): a separate value word would make "which token is the value" ambiguous, and an ambiguous boundary is an argument-injection boundary. Attributes: kind: Which validator applies (see :func:`_validate_value`). choices: Permitted values for the ``enum``/``enum_csv`` kinds. minimum: Lower bound for the numeric kinds. maximum: Upper bound for the numeric kinds. r5kindtuple[str, ...]choicesrintminimummaximumN)r8r9r:r;__annotations__rBrDrEr@r4r3rrns,  I!G_!GSGSr4rz;^[0-9]{1,5}(-[0-9]{1,5})?(,[0-9]{1,5}(-[0-9]{1,5})?){0,31}$zFinal[re.Pattern[str]] _PORT_SPEC_REz^[A-Za-z0-9._@-]{1,64}$_IDENTIFIER_REz!^[A-Za-z0-9_%=&+.:,/~@ -]{1,200}$_TEXT_REz^[A-Za-z0-9_.\-%{}":, ]{1,120}$ _WRITE_OUT_REz^[0-9a-fx]{1,16}$ _HEX_FLAGS_REz ^[0-9]{1,5}$_INT_REz^[0-9]{1,3}(\.[0-9]{1,2})?$ _FLOAT_REc Rj}|dk(r4|jvr%tdd|dtjy$|dk(rM|j d}|rt fd|Dr%tdd|dtjy$|d k(r{t j|std d|d t|}j|cxkrjks+ntd d|d jdjy$|dk(r{tj|std d|dt|}j|cxkrjks+ntd d|d jdjy$|dk(rtj|std |d|j dD]|}|j d}|D](} dt| cxkrdkrntd d| dt|dk(sPt|dt|dkDsntd d|dy$|dk(r%tj|std |dy$|dk(r%t j|std |dy$|dk(r%t"j|std |d y$|d!k(r%t$j|std |d"y$|d#k(r| td%d&t'||Std'd(|))zReturn the in-sandbox path for a workspace option, or ``None``. Raises: PentestRefusal: If the value does not satisfy ``rule``. enumvalue_not_allowedzvalue z is not one of enum_csv,c3:K|]}|jvywr,)rB).0partrules r3 z"_validate_value..sGD 4Gsz" is not a comma-separated list of int_rangevalue_malformedz is not an integervalue_out_of_rangez is outside the permitted range - float_rangez is not a number port_specz is not a port specificationrzport z is outside 1-65535r"r!z port range z is inverted identifierz is not a plain identifiertextz0 contains characters this option does not accept write_outz) is not a permitted curl write-out format hex_flagsz$ is not a set of hex flag charactersworkspace_pathN no_workspacez?a workspace is required for this option but none was configuredunknown_value_rulezno validator is defined for )r?rBrlistsplitanyrLmatchrCrDrErMfloatrGlenrHrIrJrK_in_sandbox_path) rVvaluer(r?parts int_number float_numberrUboundsbounds ` r3_validate_valuerss 99D v~  $ # dll1C0DE \ U   C GGG # !CDDVCWX N G  }}U# !2fUIEW4XY Y Z ||z9T\\9 $ $D<<.$,,1 r i  u% !2fUIEU4VW WU| |||;t||; $&F<<.$,,1 ^ U  ""5) !2ui?[4\] ]KK$ \DZZ_F 3u:--(,eW...Nr@)rTrUs r3rWz#_in_sandbox_path..s 5t4? " 5spath_escape_not_allowedz( contains an empty or traversing segmentz resolves to z which is outside the workspace z /workspace/)r startswithrgrhrresolveis_relative_toas_posix)rmr(rnrelativerootresolveds r3rlrls" />>  # 'UI%U V   u}%/5 A^1_`` KK E 5u 55 %E9D E  U|H    Dx((*H4 7 7 = %E9M(3STXSY Z  **,- ..r4ceZdZUdZded<ded<ded<ded<ded<ded <d Zd ed <d Zded<d Zded<eZ ded<e e Z ded<eZ ded<d Zded<e e Zded<e e Zded<ddZy )raOne catalog entry: what a tool is, and exactly how it may be invoked. Attributes: name: Catalog key a declared intent refers to. binary: Absolute path of the executable inside the sandbox. level: The engagement level at which this tool becomes usable. timeout_seconds: Wall-clock ceiling for one invocation. max_output_bytes: Captured-output ceiling the caller should apply. target_kind: ``"network"`` targets are scope-checked against the engagement; ``"workspace"`` targets must resolve inside the workspace and reach no network at all. target_option: Option the target is attached to, or ``None`` to place it positionally. The builder emits it; a caller may not. trailing_tokens: Literal tokens appended after a positional target. fixed_flags: Flags the builder always emits, declared in code. flags: Value-less tokens a caller may pass. value_options: Option prefix -> value rule, in attached form. forbidden: Tokens a caller may never pass. forbidden_prefixes: Token prefixes a caller may never start a token with. Checked before the allowlist, so the two can never both win. level_gated_flags: Level -> extra value-less flags permitted at or above that level. This is how one tool serves two levels: ``sqlmap`` is restricted at L2 and gains ``--dump`` only at L3. r5namebinaryrCleveltimeout_secondsmax_output_bytes target_kindN str | None target_optionr@rAtrailing_tokens fixed_flagszfrozenset[str]flags)default_factoryzMapping[str, ValueRule] value_options forbiddenforbidden_prefixeszMapping[int, frozenset[str]]level_gated_flagsz%Mapping[int, Mapping[str, ValueRule]]level_gated_optionsc|jtvr't|jdt t|j dks|j dkrt|jdd|jcxkrdksnt|jdd|jvrt|jd|j|jzrt|jdt|j|jzrt|jd t|j|jzrt|jd |jjD]\}}||jzrt|jd ||jzrt|jd |t|jzrt|jd ||jkst|jd|d|jt|jt|jzt|jz}|j j#D]}|t|z}t|j}||z}|r#t|jdt ||jD]X|vs|vrt|jddt fd|D}|s=t|jdd|y)aRefuse a catalog entry whose own rules contradict each other. An inconsistency here is not cosmetic: a flag that is also a forbidden prefix, or an option that a forbidden prefix swallows, means the allowlist and the deny list disagree and one of them silently loses. That has to be a loud failure at import time, not a surprising permission at run time. z: target_kind must be one of rz-: timeout and output ceiling must be positiver#z: level must be between 0 and 3r}z1: an empty forbidden prefix would deny everythingz$: flags and forbidden tokens overlapz*: fixed flags and forbidden tokens overlapz&: fixed flags and caller flags overlapz-: level-gated flags overlap the forbidden setz+: level-gated flags overlap the plain flagsz+: level-gated flags overlap the fixed flagsz: level-gated flags at level z- would be available at the tool's base level z*: permitted and forbidden tokens overlap: z: forbidden prefix z is also a permitted tokenc3FK|]}|js|ywr,)r)rTtokenprefixs r3rWz,PentestTool.__post_init__..fsWe>N>Nv>VeWs!!z& would swallow the permitted token(s) N)rr) ValueErrorrsortedrrrrrrsetrritemsrrvalues) r0 gated_level gated_flags permitted gated_optionsexactoverlapshadowedrs @r3 __post_init__zPentestTool.__post_init__7s(   = 0 {*G}H]G^_` `   1 $(=(=(B {*WXY YDJJ#!# {*IJK K (( ( {*[\] ] :: & {*NOP P t 4>> 1 {*TUV V t 4:: - {*PQR R(,(>(>(D(D(F  $KT^^+ DII;.[!\]]TZZ' DII;.Y!Z[[S!1!122 DII;.Y!Z[[djj( yyk!>{mL::>**G **+c$**o=DDTDT@UU !55<<> ,M ]+ +I ,DNN#e#  {*TU[\cUdTefg g-- F&I"5 yyk!4VJ>XYWWWH yyk!4VJ? (z+ r4)r6r7)r8r9r:r;rFrrr frozensetrrdictrrrrrrr@r4r3rr s2 I K J $M:$')O_)#%K%%KE>'-24-HM*H ) I~+*,,6;D6Q3QAFW[A\>\4r4rrc)r?r]filez /usr/bin/filer^-bz--brief)z --compilez --uncompress-f-Pz--preserve-date-Lz --dereference-w)rrrrrrrrnmapz /usr/bin/nmapr!i@B>-n-v-Pn-sT-sV-sn--openrO)01234)r?rB)-p-T)z-oNz-oGz-oAz-oXz-oSz-iLz-iRz --excludefilez--iflistz--resumez --datadirz--scriptz-sSz-sUz-sAz-sNz-sFz-sXz-sMz-sIz-sC-ez--source-route-S-Dz-6z --send-ethz --spoof-macz --traceroutez--packet-trace) rrrrrrrrrcurlz /usr/bin/curl<i--url>--fail--head--ipv4--silent --compressed --show-errorrXx)r?rDrEr#ra)GETHEADOPTIONS)z --max-timez--connect-timeoutz--retryrz-X)"-o--outputz-d--data-Fz--formz-K--configz--proxy-xz --upload-filerz --cookie-jar-cz--cookiez--tracez --dump-caz--cacertz--capathz --resolvez --connect-toz --interfacez --local-portz-Ez--certz--keyrz --locationz --max-redirsz --path-as-isz--protoz --unix-socketr-u) rrrrrrrrrrffufz /usr/bin/ffufrz-noninteractivez-sediWi2ii)rz-mcz-fs-t-timeout-maxtimez-rate)rz-acz -recursion-proxyr-Hr-config-requestz -replay-proxyr-frrrrhttpxz/usr/bin/httpx> -no-color-nc-silent)rr-rlz-sc-retries)-lrrrrrrrr -http-proxy-socks5rz-follow-redirectsrrrniktoz/usr/bin/niktoi,-hz-nointeractive)rrrr"z-Tuningrb)z-Format-outputrrz-hostz-evasionz-Rulesz-db-Crz-sslz -NoUpdatez-askz-Plugins) rrrrrrrrrrrnucleiz/usr/bin/nucleirrrQ)infolowmediumhighcriticalunknown)rrz -severity)rz -templatesz-tplrz-wizardrrrrrz-payloadrz -headlessz -interactshrrz-mez-markdown-exportrrrsqlmapz/usr/bin/sqlmapiX>--batch--forms--disable-coloring )mysql postgresqlsqlitemssqloraclemariadb)BEUSTQBEUUSTBESr`)z--levelz--riskz --timeoutz --retriesz --threadsz--dbmsz --techniquerz--dump)z --os-shellz--os-cmdz --sql-shellz--shellz--execz--filez--codez--pluginz --sql-queriesz--tmpdbz --dbms-credrz--request-file-rz--flush-sessionz--session-filez--savez--wizardz--crawlz--tamperz--mobilez--interactiveshellrz--confrrr) rrrrrrrrrrrhydraz/usr/bin/hydra)sshrr_r\)rrr)rrr-mz-Wz-Urrr-Irz-Oz-Arrz-kr) rrrrrrrrrr msfpythonz/usr/bin/msfpythonz-q)rrrrr z-ir custom_scriptz/usr/bin/python3)rz-B)rrrr)rrrrrrrr) rrrrrrrrr rrzFinal[dict[str, PentestTool]]rct|ts"tddt|jt j |jj}|tdd|d|S)zReturn the catalog entry for ``name``. Raises: PentestRefusal: If the name is unknown. An unknown tool is never a request to run something else. unknown_toolz tool name must be a string, got tool z is not in the pentest catalog) isinstancer5rtyper8rgetstriplower)rentrys r3rrso dC ^/OPTUYPZPcPcOd-eff KK **, -E }^uTH&>&D&D&FX" ] ;  )//1 XLFD'CJV,D&tU3v;=-AYWW XX  E97 }JugV r4c|jdk(rh|tdd|jdt|ts"tddt |j t|j|S|stdd|jdt|ts"tddt |j |j}|j|std d |d |S) aReturn the validated target token to place in the argv. ``workspace`` is optional in the type because a network tool never needs one; a workspace tool that is handed none is refused rather than resolved against an invented root. Raises: PentestRefusal: If the target is unusable, out of scope, or, for a workspace tool, outside the workspace or without a workspace. r(rdr; operates on a workspace path but no workspace was providedtarget_malformedztarget must be a string, got no_scopez> addresses the network but the engagement authorises no targettarget_out_of_scopeztarget z. is not inside the authorised engagement scope) rrrrr5rr8rlrallows)r%targetscoper(r`s r3_resolve_targetr0\s " ;&    }$_` &#& !37TUYZ`UaUjUjTk5lm m  ::  DII= ^ _   fc "/3PQUV\Q]QfQfPg1hii <<>D <<  !dXK L   Kr4cleZdZUdZded<ded<ded<ded<d ed <ded <ded <ded <ded<y)ruA tool invocation the catalog has authorized, ready to be executed. This object — not the model, and not the caller — is what decides what runs. ``argv`` is built here; ``argv_text`` is a human-readable rendering of the very same vector, used as the approval record's resource so a reviewer reads the command that will actually run. Attributes: tool: Catalog entry that was used. target: The validated target, as it appears in ``argv``. level: Engagement level the invocation was authorised at. action: Security-plane action for that level. argv: The reconstructed argument vector. argv_text: ``shlex.join`` rendering of ``argv``, for display only. timeout_seconds: Wall-clock ceiling for this invocation. max_output_bytes: Captured-output ceiling for this invocation. engagement_digest: Digest of the engagement the call was authorised under, recorded so an audit reader can tie the run to the terms. rr%r5r.rCrrrAargv argv_textrrengagement_digestN)r8r9r:r;rFr@r4r3rrs;(  K J K Nr4r)r/r( audit_lognowc t|||||S#t$r}|t|tr|ni}|j t j ddt|jdxsdtjt|dd|jt|t|jdt|jd | |jndd  d}~wwxYw) a.Reconstruct an argv from a declared intent, or refuse. Args: intent: The declared intent. Only ``tool``, ``target``, ``args`` and ``level`` are read; any other key is ignored rather than trusted, so a payload cannot smuggle a pre-built command line past the catalog. engagement: The signed artifact. ``None`` is a refusal, never a default engagement. scope: Whitelist to check the target against; defaults to the scope derived from ``engagement.targets``. workspace: Host path of the writable workspace this call may use. audit_log: Log that receives the authorization decision and, for every refusal, a record naming the reason. now: Override for the engagement's time window, for tests. Returns: The authorized call. The caller executes ``result.argv`` and nothing else. Raises: PentestRefusal: For every refusal, with a ``reason_code`` suitable for the audit log. Each one is recorded there before it is raised. ) engagementr/r(r6N pentestertask_idr} pentest_toolrefusedr%r.)detailr%r.r4)actoragent_idr:rresulterrormetadata)_authorize_tool_callrrrrecordrPERMISSION_CHECKr5rr _safe_levelr/ _safe_textdigest)intentr8r/r(r5r6refusalreadables r3rrs># !      8B&'7RVXZH   //!$HLL39r:&**;x+@.Q ))!'l&x||F';<(h)?@>H>T):):Z\    -s C-C C((C-cj|jd}t|tst|tsy|S)z>Return the declared level as an int, or -1 when it is not one.r)rrboolrC)rIrs r3rFrFs+ JJw E%j&< Lr4c<t|tr|St|Sr,)rr5repr)rms r3rGrGsuc*5;U ;r4c| tddt|ts"tddt|j|j |stdd|j ddd t|jd }|jd }| |j}n1t|tst|tstd d ||}|dks|dkDrtd d|d||jkr)tdd|jd|jd||j|sOtdd|j ddd|jdt|j d|dt#|d ||n |j$}|'t'|j)j+nd} |j,dk(r| tdd|jdt/||jd|| } |jd!} | d"} t| t0t2fst| t4s"td#d$t| jt7| t8kDrtd%d&t8d'g} | D]} t| t0s"td(d)t| j| j;}|s td(d*t7|t<kDrtd+d,t<d-t?|||| .}| jA||n||jBg|jD| }|jF|jI|jF| fn|jA| |jI|jJtM|| |tO|tQ|tSjT||jV|jX|j / S)0zLBuild the authorized call. See :func:`authorize_tool_call` for the contract.N no_engagementzMan engagement authorization is required; without one the tool call is refusedintent_malformedzintent must be a mapping, got engagement_window_closedz engagement z& is outside its authorised time windowr%rlevel_malformedzlevel must be an integer, got rr#zlevel z is outside 0-3tool_above_levelrz requires level z, the call declared level level_not_engagedz permits at most level z and tool class z, which does not cover level z ()r(rdr)r.)r/r(argsr@args_malformedz0args must be a sequence of argument tokens, got too_many_argumentszat most z arguments are acceptedargument_malformedz%every argument must be a string, got zan argument must not be emptyargument_too_longzan argument must not exceed z characters)rr() r%r.rrr2r3rrr4)-rrrrr8 is_activerHrr max_levelrNrCrr engages_levelrallowed_tool_classesrr/r expanduserrrr0r5bytesrrkrrr&r'appendrrrextendrrrtupleshlexjoinrr)rIr8r/r(r6r%declared_levelrresolved_scoperc target_tokenraw_argstokensrawr validatedr2s r3rCrCs*  [   fg &/3QRVW]R^RgRgQh1ijj    $ &*++CR011W X  F+ ,DZZ(N$$ ND )NC1P.2PQ_Pb0cdd qyEAI.& 0QRR tzz DII= 0 +A DII= [ \  #4H)=^_mnLzz&!H(S%L)Hh1O >tH~?V?V>W X   8}}$ H]O;R"S  FE#s# $7S 8J8J7KL   !57VW W u:+ + #./B.C;O %T5X  9#8ieDE" KK 4$** 4V 4D % T''67 L!KK$$%  & 4[**T",,..$++  r4cTttjdDcgc]}|j|jt j |jd|j|j|j|jt|jt|jzt|jztd|jjDtd|jjDzd c}Scc}w)zPReturn a JSON-compatible view of the catalog, for ``cyberbrain pentest --list``.c2|j|jfSr,)rr)items r3z"describe_catalog..xs DII?Vr4)keyr}c3.K|] }|D]}|ywr,r@)rTrflags r3rWz#describe_catalog..os',u,GK,,c3.K|] }|D]}|ywr,r@)rToptionsr&s r3rWz#describe_catalog..rs-%rx) r%rr!rrrrallowed_argumentslevel_gated_arguments)rrrrrr rrrrrrrrrr)rs r3rras.GNN,2VW+ * 'JJ[[-11%++rBll ,,$44 % 6 6!' !4U(()"*U&&'"(&,,"'"9"9"@"@"B,&$88??A&   sC?D%)rVrrmr5r( Path | Noner6r)rmr5r(rr6r5)robjectr6r)rrCr6r5) r%rrr5rrCr(r}r6r) r%rr.r~r/r r(r}r6r5)rIMapping[str, object]r8EngagementAuthorization | Noner/TargetScope | Noner(str | Path | Noner5zAuditLog | Noner6 float | Noner6r)rIrr6rC)rmr~r6r5) rIrr8rr/rr(rr6rr6r)r6zlist[dict[str, Any]]);r; __future__rrerhcollections.abcrr dataclassesrrpathlibrtypingr r cyberbrain26.agents.engagementr r r !cyberbrain26.security_plane.auditrr&cyberbrain26.security_plane.permissionr__all__rrFrr&rr)rrcompilerGrHrIrJrKrLrMrsrlr_WORKSPACE_PATH _PORT_SPECrrrrr'r0rrrFrGrCrr@r4r3rs.`# -( G@ & *& z"%Z%'0)[1I'J $J '] ' $()3 3q(r %r)34N)O&O#-2::.R#S S(2 3U(V %V(2 3G(H %H","**_"= =$.BJJ/M$N !NWt#/L $^^^N!12 K (  y)*   (  "JK1JK  , Z   bc#aM!* QPR!S k1aH-1KL # %6 n   *E23!+sCH+q'JaD!{ArJ!{AtLKDI  %# H  78aD!{ArJ+q$G+sCH!{AqI   !"F ")*+!{ArJ!{AtL   9+67  '#J  "E*++q$G!{AqI"P  #*V  "DE k1aH[!QG" QK" QJ" QKW%&:]^V,  i 34 15n   ."2F   #$J #" F! !" 3 { G* &GT   1 1 1  1  1  1h) ) )  )  )  )X $H!%#'!%= =/=  = ! =  = ==@<i i/i  i ! i  iiXr4